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BOARD MEMBERS’ CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC DECISION-
MAKING IN SMALL FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores how the boards of small firms actually undertake to perform 
strategic tasks. Board strategic involvement has seldom been investigated in the context 
of small firms. We seek to make a contribution by investigating antecedents of board 
strategic involvement. The antecedents are “board working style” and “board quality 
attributes”, which go beyond the board composition features of board size, CEO duality, 
the ratio of non-executive to executive directors and ownership. Hypotheses were tested 
on a sample of 497 Norwegian firms (from 5 to 30 employees). Our results show that 
board working style and board quality attributes rather than board composition features 
enhance board strategic involvement. Moreover, board quality attributes outperform 
board working style in fostering board strategic involvement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last few years there has been increasing interest in board activities from 
both academics and policy-makers, since boards do not seem to do their job properly as 
various scandals might indicate (Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, etc). According to 
agency theory, the board serves as a control mechanism, aiming to guard against 
potential managerial misconduct at the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). However, this is not the only activity of the board. The board is involved 
in other activities like strategic decision-making (Huse 2007; Stiles and Taylor 2002; 
Useem 2003; Zahra and Pearce 1989), which is the focus of our study and has not been 
explored as much as other activities ascribed to boards (Gabrielsson and Winlund 2000; 
Van den Heuvel, Van Gils and Voordeckers 2006).  
In this paper, we investigate what the board in small firms does in relation to 
strategic issues and what enhances board strategic involvement. We explore the effects 
of “board working style” and “board quality attributes” on the directors’ involvement in 
shaping strategic decisions. Board working style refers to the organization of board 
meetings and board work, while board quality attributes refer to board knowledge, 
diversity and motivation to participate. These two dimensions are in line with process-
oriented research to understand the sources of “value-creating board” (Huse 2007; 
McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Zajac and Westphal 1998). We apply agency theory, the 
resource-based view of the firm and arguments from a cognitive perspective to 
understand effects of the two dimensions on board strategic involvement in small firms. 
Agency theory captures a normative perspective that governance needs to 
handle. It specifically points out the need to reduce information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent, which hinders the ability of decision-makers in the strategic 
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arena (Eisenhardt 1989). We propose to examine board working style that could 
mitigate information asymmetry. Effective governance of small firms also depends on 
the firm’s capability of tapping board knowledge (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). We 
additionally draw from the resource-based view and the cognitive perspective to 
examine board quality attributes.  
In general, board strategic tasks denote a set of activities like shaping mission, 
vision and values, identifying important strategic activities and scanning the 
environment for trends and opportunities (Hendry and Kiel 2004: 511). Most empirical 
studies of board strategic involvement have so far focused on large firms (Fiegener 
2005; Pettigrew 1992; Zahra 1990). The results of previous studies, however, are 
problematic for understanding board strategic involvement in small firms because of the 
differences between small and large firms (Castaldi and Wortman 1984). Small firms 
represent a unique setting with regard to board tasks and functioning. For example, no 
matter which definition is adopted, managers of small firms bear a major stake of 
wealth effects of their decisions (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Consequently, owners of 
small firms may be more concerned about firm survival, growth rate, family welfare, 
succession plan, personal status, etc. than retaining short-term financial returns that are 
a core concern of shareholders in public companies. The different focuses of interests 
may affect how boards perform their strategic tasks. The lack of empirical 
investigations regarding board strategic involvement in small firms therefore indicates a 
research need, which becomes more urgent when small firms have higher demand than 
large firms for the board’s strategic contributions to the firm’s survival and future 
growth (Daily and Dalton 1993; Huse 2000). Our study thus represents a timely attempt 
to acquire more knowledge in this respect. 
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The contribution of this study is two-fold. First, the two antecedents—board 
working style and board quality attributes—are more important sources of board 
effectiveness (boards are actively involved in tasks performance which further enhances 
firm growth and performance) than board composition features, which refer to board 
size, CEO duality, the ratio of non-executive to executive directors and ownership. In 
studies of large firms, board composition features have generated ambiguous results 
concerning board strategic involvement. For example, boards that effectively resisted 
green mails were found to have more outside (non-executive) directors (Kosnik 1987). 
However, another study shows that more outside (non-executive) directors seem to 
discourage corporate entrepreneurship, an important strategy for firm survival (Zahra 
1996). The ambiguity seems to suggest that board composition features may not be the 
fundamental factor that enhances strategic involvement in large firms. This result is also 
confirmed in our studies of small firms. The most effective factors, as our study 
suggests, are board working style and board quality attributes. Second, this study 
improves our understanding of the difference between board working style and board 
quality attributes. Board quality attributes outperform board working style in enhancing 
board strategic involvement. As a result, owners of small firms who wish to improve 
board performance in the strategic arena may do better by focusing on board quality 
attributes as a competitive resource.  
Below, we first present theoretical foundations and hypotheses. Then we 
describe the method and research design, with a brief overview of the survey and items 
in the questionnaire. After presenting the results we conclude with some research 
implications. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The board is expected to play a key function in shaping the strategy of the firm. 
Board strategic involvement, albeit challenged by many scholars, is widely recognised 
as one of the major tasks of the board (Andrews 1981a, 1981b; Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Golden and Zajac 2001; Huse 2007; 
McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Zahra and Pearce 1990).  
However, we still lack consensus about the boundary of board strategic 
involvement (Herman 1981; Judge and Zeithaml 1992; Lorsch and McIver 1989; Mace 
1971). Board strategic involvement is a complex and multidimensional concept that 
cannot be comprehended within one single theoretical lens (Ravasi and Zattoni 2006). 
Different researchers may view board strategic involvement from different angles. For 
example, according to Zahra and Pearce’s study “board strategic involvement refers to 
the level of attention given by director to the various areas of the strategy process. 
Therefore board strategic involvement covers corporate mission development, strategy 
conception and formulation, and strategy implementation.” (1990: 165). This definition 
covers a broad area. Ruigrok et al. narrow down the area of board strategic involvement, 
and claim that it should include: “evaluation and proposals of different alternatives and 
consider different options” (2006: 1205). In this definition the implementation of 
strategy is however excluded. It also excludes a new strategy formulation from board 
strategic involvement, which some researchers disagree with (Henke 1986; Schmidt and 
Bauer 2006; Stiles and Taylor 2002). For these researchers, the board not only evaluates 
and ratifies existing strategies from the management, but also takes initiatives to 
formulate them. In addition, there is a substantive body of research indicating that, 
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while the board is an important factor influencing firm strategy, the CEO is also a vital 
or even decisive force in shaping firm strategy (Carpenter and Westphal 2001; Westphal 
and Fredrickson 2001). In short, the boundary of board strategic involvement is 
ambiguous and difficult to decide, which leaves room for further empirical examination. 
In spite of the ambiguity stated above, we adopt the definition that board 
strategic involvement in general refers to shaping mission, vision and values, 
identifying important strategic activities and scanning the environment for trends and 
opportunities (Hendry and Kiel 2004: 511). We particularly focus on small firms and 
explore factors that strengthen board strategic involvement.  
It is acknowledged that CEOs in small firms also desire the board’s participation 
in the strategic domain to improve decision-making quality (Ford 1988) and enhance 
the firm’s products and services (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt and Lymann, 1990). Studies 
on board strategic involvement in small firms are still in their infancy. Board 
effectiveness in small firms has been investigated mainly in relation to the service and 
control tasks (Gabrielsson and Winlund 2000; Minichilli and Hansen 2007; 
Voordeckers, Van Gils and Van den Heuvel 2007) while little path-breaking research 
on board strategic task has been carried out and still remains a controversial issue (Huse 
2000). The results of those few studies addressing board strategic involvement in small 
firms are somewhat conflicting. Some show that the board of small firms tends to be 
rather passive in its strategic involvement, and even claim that strategic participation is 
not the dominant activity of the board in very small firms unless there are specific 
contextual conditions (Dyer 1986). However, there are other studies that show the 
opposite (Huse 1990). This suggests that the current foundation for understanding board 
strategic involvement in small firms is still weak. 
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Overall, the board of directors in small firms has seldom been investigated, 
compared to the empirical studies available for large firms. Some may argue that we 
could infer study results for small firms from large firms and venture-capital-backed 
firms, which could however be problematic and even misleading (Lerner 1994).  
In this study, we develop a model to examine the variation of board strategic 
involvement in small firms, as illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  
The main arguments are drawn from agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Fama and 
Jensen 1983), the resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991) and a cognitive 
perspective (Rindova 1999; Westphal 1999). One main problem, according to agency 
theory, is asymmetric information distribution between the principal and the agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989). The principal and the agent have different exposures to information. 
This problem still exists between the board that represents the principal and the agent 
because the board works on a periodical basis while the management does so on a daily 
basis. Potential information asymmetry between the board and the management can 
hinder board task performance which depends on critical information. We argue that an 
effective board working style may reduce information asymmetry and hence strengthens 
board strategic involvement. According to the resource-based view of the firm, we 
argue that directors’ in-depth knowledge and diverse expertise represent a source of 
competitive advantage, which can lead to superior board performance in the strategic 
arena. The resource-based view also reflects the logic of the knowledge-based 
perspective in governance (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004), which indicates the possibility 
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and necessity to tap board knowledge. In addition, directors’ motivation to participate 
strengthens directors’ desire to establish a collaborative working relationship with the 
CEO such that board strategic involvement is enhanced. 
 
Board working style 
Board working style relates to organizing and conducting board meetings and 
reflecting board work periodically. We use board working style to explore effects of 
meeting processes on board strategic involvement. This approach has seldom been 
investigated (Demb and Neubauer 1992; Lehmann, Warning and Wiegand 2004). 
Agency theory helps to shed light on the importance of board working style as a means 
of reducing information asymmetry between the directors and the managers.  
According to agency theory, shareholders (the principal) relinquish control of 
the firm to managers (the agent) hired to run the daily operation (Fama and Jensen 
1983). The management benefits from its daily operation and acquires more firm-
specific information than the directors who only meet periodically (Lorsch and MacIver 
1989). Firm information is therefore asymmetrically distributed between the 
management and the board. Asymmetric information can further cause problems for the 
board to effectively perform its tasks which depend on critical, firm-specific 
information. For example, the board control function is effective only when the board 
knows what to control (Levinthal 1988). Eisenhardt suggests reducing information 
asymmetry by investing in information systems such as budgeting systems and 
reporting procedures (1989). In essence, Eisenhardt tends to solve information 
asymmetry by designing a behavioural contract that can reveal the agent’s behaviour to 
the principal.  
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We propose another way to reduce information asymmetry by investigating 
board working style. It is a process-oriented approach that improves information 
distribution through board meeting designs and evaluations of board work. There are 
few empirical studies linking board ability of seeking information to board performance 
(Rutherford and Buchholtz 2007). In this study, we explore three aspects: 1) how 
effective the board evaluation process is, 2) how frequent board meetings are held and 
3) how long board meetings usually last.  
Board evaluation is a periodic review process of the information infrastructure 
such as the board meeting. During this process, the board reviews contributions of 
board meetings, evaluates the weakness of the current meeting structure and initiates 
improvement plans for information provision. Consequently, board evaluation enhances 
the efficiency and quality of information flow between the board and the management. 
However, this aspect of information processing has not been widely investigated in 
previous research with few exceptions (Demb and Neubauer 1992; Finkelstein and 
Mooney 2003). These studies suggest that a formal evaluation plan helps directors to 
achieve what processes should accomplish by developing the right kind of 
communication between the directors and the management. When the board is able to 
gain important information about the firm, the likelihood of better strategic performance 
increases. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Establishment of board evaluation practices enhances board 
strategic involvement. 
 
The number of board meetings reflects the frequency of information exchange. 
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Board meetings provide valuable opportunities for directors to discuss and dispute the 
main issues facing the firm, to accomplish their legal duties and responsibilities and to 
perform their expected tasks. The frequency of board meetings has sometimes been 
considered a measure of board effectiveness in itself, in particular, when the board’s 
periodical working pattern is taken into account (Rutherford and Buchholtz 2007). It 
makes intuitive sense. The board in reality spends much less time on running the firm 
than its management. Information asymmetry about the firm is therefore unavoidable 
between them. However, as the decision-making apex, the board needs to comprehend a 
substantial set of firm-specific information and knowledge to make intelligible and 
coherent business plans to survive. This process takes time. Increasing the meeting 
frequency can counteract the weakness of the board’s periodical working pattern and its 
effect on information exchange. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The frequency of board meetings enhances board strategic 
involvement. 
 
The length of board meetings reflects the general duration of information 
exchange in board meetings. Discussions about relevant choices, both in terms of the 
strategic context or defining the competitive strategy, require that board meetings last 
for quite a long time (Stiles 2001). Therefore the length of board meetings may provide 
a “time buffer” for the directors to recognize and identify firm-specific information of 
critical importance. In addition, the directors also need enough time to properly utilize 
comprehensive knowledge they have obtained. Even if it is not proved that two-day 
meetings are more effective than shorter councils, we argue that long meetings may 
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enable the board to develop a safer procedure to reduce undesirable consequences 
caused by information asymmetry. Decisions made during this comprehensive 
procedure are perhaps more relevant and effective.   
 
Hypothesis 1c: The length of board meetings enhances board strategic 
involvement. 
 
Board quality attributes  
Traditional research into corporate governance has taken the board as a 
mechanism to prevent managers’ misconduct and protect shareholders’ wealth. An 
increasing number of studies have broadened this view by analyzing the quality 
attributes of the board (Charan 1998; Forbes and Milliken 1999; Leblanc and Gillies 
2005), which we categorize into three aspects: a) board knowledge, b) board diversity 
and c) the directors’ motivation to participate. We draw our arguments from the 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991) to explain the effect of the first two 
aspects on board strategic involvement, and then we use the argument of cognitive 
behaviour prone to collaboration (Westphal 1999) to explain the effect of the last aspect 
on that. 
The resource-based view of the firm indicates that having unique and inimitable 
resources would foster firms’ ability to pursue good performance. The board might be 
seen as a valuable asset of the firm when it is actively involved in decision-making and 
challenges the CEO’s proposals through the interpreting, scanning and choice activity. 
Effective involvement in the process requires skills and the board’s in-depth knowledge 
(Ruigrok et al. 2006; Stiles 2001).   
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Board knowledge reflects the degree of directors’ understanding of firm 
operations. It entails in-depth knowledge of the firm covering information on the firm’s 
industry, competitors, customers, technology, etc. This knowledge is a tacit asset and its 
utility is difficult to substitute. It is an important source of the board’s ability to perform 
various tasks (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Hillman and Dalziel 2003). For example, 
Fama and Jensen argue that the presence of in-depth knowledge of the firm forms a 
valuable and unique resource, which is critical for the board to exercise its decision-
controlling task over the management (1983). Other researchers have also noted the 
importance of in-depth knowledge of the firm. They argue that it helps the board focus 
on relevant decision alternatives (Charan 1998) and enables it to efficiently comprehend 
business operations and internal management issues (Forbes and Milliken 1999).  
We further claim that enhancing in-depth knowledge of the firm could reduce 
the board’s passive behaviour, under which directors seldom discuss with CEOs or 
challenge them, but “rubber stamp” the CEO’s proposals without reflection (Mace 
1971; Lorsch and MacIver 1989). In short, the board does not perform the function of 
checks-and-balances. The reason, as we see, could be partly due to the lack of firm-
specific information such that useful and constructive communication is unlikely to 
occur. It is thus reasonable that the board should acquire sufficient in-depth knowledge 
of the firm to potentially improve board strategic involvement.   
 
Hypothesis 2a: In-depth knowledge of the firm enhances board strategic 
involvement. 
 
Board diversity refers to the diversity of directors’ skills and expertise in terms 
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of their functional, industrial and educational background. This type of diversity is 
classified as a job-related diversity, and is found to be positively associated with group 
performance (Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin 1999). According to the resource-based view, 
a board with job-related diversity enjoys a broader information pool, which ultimately 
enhances the board’s ability to identify creative and innovative solutions (William and 
O’Reilly 1998). The need for diversity in expertise and skills also reflects the value of 
board capital, which is argued to strengthen the board’s service and control task 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). For small firms, job-related diversity becomes 
more important when the executive’s experience is relatively limited (Zahra and 
Filatotchev 2004). They thus recruit directors with rich experience, expertise and skills 
to deal with the complexity (Daily and Dalton 1993). These studies claim that non-
executive directors are more capable of bringing the expertise and skills that small firms 
need. We argue that the benefit of the diversity resides in the state of mind of the board 
rather than the number of non-executive directors. Therefore, we choose to analyze 
board diversity directly. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Board diversity enhances board strategic performance.   
 
At the same time, the argument from a cognitive perspective suggests that board 
members contribute to the function of the board through their “scanning, interpreting 
and choice activity” (Rindova 1999) that is linked to an inner drive to do a good job, 
which forms collaborative behaviour between the board and the management (Westphal 
1999). As a result, board task performance could be improved. 
The directors’ motivation to participate refers to the directors’ inner drive to do a 
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good job. The directors’ motivation to do a good job is seldom considered to be a major 
issue to explain board behaviour. In general, directors are believed to choose 
directorship on a board for reasons of financial gain. However, there are also studies 
showing that non-financial motivations also exist, which may have a stronger effect on 
the decision of directorship than the financial remuneration has (Lorsch and MacIver 
1989). The non-financial inner drive could be caused by the legal responsibility 
(Hermalin and Weisebach 1988) or professional satisfaction gained from doing a good 
job (Charan 1998). This kind of motivation may enhance the CEO’s understanding that 
the board’s major concern is the firm. An environment that favours collaborative 
behaviour is formed. 
According to the collaborative behaviour view between the board and the 
management, we are encouraged to identify social factors that can facilitate 
communication between the management and the board (Westphal 1999). The 
collaborative type of communication holds that the CEO trusts the board and dares to 
disclose information of a sensitive nature because the CEO believes that the board 
would not take personal advantages from it. We argue that when the directors show 
their motivations to join the board because of professional standards and legal 
responsibility to the firm rather than financial payment, collaborative behaviour 
between the board and the CEO is enhanced, which facilitates the creation of an open 
and productive communication between the board and the CEO, and consequently 
board task performance is improved. In addition, collaborative behaviour implies a 
willingness of the CEO to share information of critical importance with the board. As a 
result, information asymmetry is also reduced.   
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Hypothesis 2c: The personal motivation to participate enhances board strategic 
involvement. 
 
2. METHOD 
 
 2.1 Data collection and sample - “The Small Business Survey”  
Our data sample comes from the database of “Value Creating Board” based on 
Norwegian firms. There are three reasons for us to use the Norwegian database. First, 
this database provides relatively sufficient observations—497 CEO responses—
comparing with similar studies based on the survey method. Second, using this 
Norwegian database provides some interesting results, which are unlikely to emerge 
from studies using dominant databases from the United States and the UK. The result of 
this unique database benefits small firms in general where the country effect may not be 
an imperative mechanism. We took particular consideration of employee numbers 
which, according to a legal requirement of employee representatives, may affect the 
generalization of our data. As a result, we carefully selected small firms with employee 
numbers below 30, a threshold in which the requirement is not compulsory (Randoy and 
Nielsen 2002). Third, our study of Norwegian boards in small firms may add values to 
recent studies of board roles in SMEs based on a similar database from Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Voordeckers et al. 2007). 
Hypotheses are tested on small Norwegian firms with 5 to 30 employees, and a 
turnover between NOK 1,000 and 50,000,000. Data were gathered from a questionnaire, 
which was sent out to 3,000 CEOs of small firms randomly chosen from the database in 
2003-2004. We excluded sole proprietorship and partnerships due to the missing 
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requirement of a board. Norwegian law requires a one-tier board in SMEs that delegates 
the daily operations to a separate management team (Randoy and Nielsen 2002). One 
reminder was sent out to those non-responding firms after the first mailing. There were 
973 responses after the reminder. 476 out of 973 reported that the questionnaire was not 
relevant to them, hence the final responses of 497.  
The responding firms had a mean of approximately 15 employees, with a yearly 
turnover of about 32 million Norwegian Kronas (corresponding to UsD 4.9 million); 
43.4% of the respondents perceive their firms as a family firm. 
The board size on average is 3.46, 48.67% of whom are outsiders. In 29.18% of 
cases there is a CEO duality, and CEOs own on average 60.38% of the firm, which 
indicates the CEO is the largest shareholder of the firm. Board ownership is also 
measured, which on average owns about 65.58% of the shares. The last change in board 
membership occurred in the year 2000, which indicates that board membership does not 
frequently change.  
 
2.2 Measures 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is board strategic involvement. It is a multidimensional 
concept, and is too broad to deal with (Brauer and Schmidt 2006). We aim to measure 
directly board strategic involvement by using 11 multiple items, which could be further 
classified according to different dimensions. For example, McNulty and Pettigrew study 
the construct of board strategic involvement by interviewing 108 firm directors, and 
classified three types of strategic involvement as taking strategic decisions, shaping 
strategic decisions and shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy (1999: 55). 
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It is a classification based on action in the strategic arena.  
We chose to focus on the content of strategic involvement. A recent study of 
board strategic involvement indicates that board strategic tasks cover internal, external 
and strategic focuses (Huse 2005). The internal focus addresses activities in following 
up firm performance indicators like cost budgets and sales budgets. The external focus 
addresses the issues of social pressures and forces that the firm needs to consider like 
CSR. The strategic focus addresses the process of developing strategy through activities 
like formulating and ratifying strategies. The 11 items of board strategic involvement 
cover the above three focuses.  
A five-point Likert-like scale measurement was used to record the answers. The 
lowest value indicates strong disagreement, and the highest value indicates strong 
agreement. We ran factory analysis with the maximum likelihood estimation method 
and Varimax rotation. Three sub-constructs are confirmed (see Table 1), reflecting the 
internal, external and strategic focuses. We label these three sub-constructs as social 
strategy (three items), strategy follow up (four items), and competitive strategy (four 
items). In particular, the social strategy sub-construct reflects the external focus, 
including items that deal with health, environment and safety issues, and CSR. The 
strategy follow-up reflects the internal focus, and it denotes a kind of watchdog-activity 
to check whether the strategic choices have been properly implemented by the 
executives. This construct includes follow-up items on cost budgets, sales budgets, firm 
liquidity, investments and human resources. Finally, the competitive strategy reflects 
the strategic focus, and includes the board’s strategic proposals, ratifying long-term 
strategy, implementing strategy decisions and controlling and evaluating strategic 
choices.  
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Cronbach’s alpha statistics are 0.849 for social strategy, 0.887 for strategy 
follow-up, and 0.904 for competitive strategy definition. These values indicate a strong 
consistency among items. The factor scores of the three sub-constructs were recorded 
for subsequent regression analysis. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Independent variables 
There are two types of independent variables, one is board working style and the 
other is the factor scores of the latent construct of board quality attributes. 
Board working style includes three variables. The first is the establishment of 
board evaluation, measured by a five-point Likert-like scale. The second and third 
variables are the number and length of board meetings.  
Factor analysis was used with the maximum likelihood estimation method and 
Varimax rotation to analyze board quality attributes. Three sub-constructs are 
confirmed: board knowledge, board diversity, and the directors’ motivation. They were 
all recorded by using the five-point Likert-like scale measurement. Board knowledge is 
measured by four items, aiming at defining whether the board as a whole is 
knowledgeable about activities and key functions of the firm, critical technology, key 
weaknesses of the firm and development in the firm environment (Cronbach’s 
α= 0.795). Board diversity is measured by three items, concerning functional, industrial 
and educational background (Cronbach’s α= 0.654. The directors’ motivation is 
measured by two items, assessing motivation through legal responsibility and 
professional standards (Cronbach’s α= 0.555). This value seems low; however, low 
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construct reliability is acceptable if the items measure what the construct intends to 
measure (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). We intend to measure the inner drive of the 
board beyond financial payment; we thus view the construct of the directors’ motivation 
acceptable. We present the factor analysis of board quality attributes in Table 2. Factor 
scores were recorded for later regression analysis. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
    
Control variables  
We first control for board composition features, which are board size, CEO 
duality, the ratio of non-executive to executive directors and ownership. 
Board size indicates the number of board directors with voting rights. 
Researchers argue that board size affects board performance (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Specifically, board size could be “systematically related to the organization’s 
apparent need to deal with important external sectors in the environment in such a way 
as to ensure successful operations and an adequate supply for the future” (Pfeffer 1972: 
225). Therefore, the larger the board, the better cushioning effect the board can offer.  
Other researchers have argued for a U-shaped relation between board size and board 
effectiveness (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000). That is, the effectiveness of the board 
is diminishing after it has reached a certain size. However, as we do not expect small 
firms to have large boards, small firms may enjoy effectiveness due to the size effect.  
CEO duality is measured by a “dummy variable” (yes or no). In small firms, the 
CEO and board chairperson position is usually held by one person. This practice has 
drawn many criticisms according to agency theory. It is a question of incentive 
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mechanisms; one is unable to exercise a control function over oneself. Agency theory 
strongly argues for the separation of the board chair position and the CEO position, thus 
increasing board effectiveness and firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). We 
control for CEO duality in the test. 
Non-executives’ ratio measures the ratio of non-executive to executive directors. 
However, the effect of this ratio is still under debate. For example, some researchers 
point out that non-executive directors do not affect board strategic involvement (Zahra 
1996), while others found a positive and significant impact of non-executives’ ratio on 
board performance (Hambrick and Jackson 2000) and the board resistance to green 
mails (Kosnick 1987). In one recent study, Filatotchev found that the number of 
executive directors is an important source of competitive advantage in IPO firms 
(2006). We control for the ratio of non-executive directors. 
Ownership is measured by the equity held by all board members. Ownership 
functions as an incentive mechanism, which can stimulate board members with equity 
stakes in the firm to work hard to secure the quality of board performance in the 
strategic arena. As a result, performance is improved. Some studies focus on the 
ownership of non-executive directors (Filatotchev 2006). However, our data do not 
provide ownership of non-executive directors. We hope the difference made by non-
executive directors could be partly captured by the previous control variable—non-
executives’ ratio. Therefore we only control for the total effect of board ownership on 
board strategic involvement.  
Secondly, we control for firm age (Filatotchev and Toms 2003). The longer the 
firm has been established, the more robust the firm’s financial resources, which may 
affect board strategic involvement. For a similar reason, we also control previous firm 
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performance, employee numbers and the year of the last board change.    
We present the correlation matrix of all the variables in Table 3.   
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We use SPSS to run linear regression analysis. The dependent variables include 
sub-constructs of board strategic involvement: competitive strategy, follow-up strategy 
and social strategy. In addition, we include one factor score for overall strategic 
involvement, representing all 11 items of strategic involvement. 
There are three models. Model I runs regression analysis on the control 
variables. Model II includes all control variables in addition to the independent variable 
of board working style. Model III includes the control variables and the independent 
variables of board working style and board quality attributes. We present the regression 
analysis in Table 4 to 7. 
 
Insert Table 4-7 about here 
 
Hypothesis 1a states that formal board evaluation enhances board strategic 
involvement. A positive and significant effect is identified for board strategic 
involvement in overall strategy (0.202), competitive strategy (0.194) and social strategy 
(0.154). These results indicate that formal board evaluation affects board meetings 
where firm strategies are scrutinized, rectified, implemented and controlled. However, 
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we found no significant effect for board involvement in strategy follow-up (the 
coefficient is -0.007). The insignificant effect could have different explanations. One 
possible explanation is that board involvement in strategy follow-up is less dependent 
on formal board evaluation. Small firms, particularly those at an early stage, may need 
the board’s continuous effort to follow up activities of strategic importance, and to 
ensure the survival and growth of the firm regardless of the establishment of formal 
board evaluation. Small firms may thus not prioritize the establishment of formal board 
evaluation at an early stage of the firm. However, as the firm matures over time, the 
advantage of establishing formal board evaluation may be too great to be ignored.  
 Hypothesis 1b suggests that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and board strategic involvement. The 
coefficient for predicting board strategic involvement in strategy follow-up is 0.148, 
with significance at the 0.05 level (2 tailed). It indicates that the higher the frequency of 
board meetings, the more involved the board in strategic follow-up will be. This result 
is consistent with hypothesis 1a concerning board involvement in strategy follow-up. 
Namely, small firms continuously need input from board strategic follow up, and a high 
frequency of board meetings matches such a need. From another point of view, we 
could argue that the high frequency replaces formal board evaluation in the case of 
strategy follow up. However, the effect of board meeting frequency on board 
involvement in social strategy is negative (-0.145), and the effect on board involvement 
in competitive strategy is not confirmed either.  
 Hypothesis 1c suggests a positive relationship between the length of board 
meetings and board strategic involvement. The length is positively and significantly 
related to board involvement in competitive strategy (0.109), while it does not seem to 
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be relevant to overall strategic involvement, strategic follow-up and social strategy. 
To sum up, board structural features represented by formal board evaluation, the 
frequency of board meetings and the length of board meetings could enhance board 
strategic involvement to a certain degree, but they are not able to fully explain and 
capture the board’s contribution to strategic issues. 
Hypothesis 2a states that there is a positive relation between board knowledge 
and board strategic involvement. Positive and significant relationships are found for 
board involvement in competitive strategy (0.249), strategy follow-up (0.198) and 
overall strategy (0.313). The effect for social strategy, however, is not significant. This 
may indicate that the nature of board involvement in social strategy requires less 
knowledge and skills to comprehend than do competitive strategy and strategy follow-
up. On the whole, board knowledge is a valuable resource, which enhances board 
strategic performance. Hypothesis 2a is therefore supported.  
Hypothesis 2b asserts a positive relation between board diversity and board 
strategic involvement. The coefficients are significant for competitive strategy (0.129), 
strategy follow-up (0.207), social strategy (0.135) and overall strategy (0.257). The 
hypothesis is supported. The board is made up of a group of people; in order to make 
the board an active and performing body it is necessary that all the required knowledge 
and skills be held within the board, not only on a single member level, but as a group. 
The diversity of background increases the pool of knowledge and hence the information 
availability, which contributes to the creation of innovative solutions. Board strategic 
performance is enhanced.  
Hypothesis 2c states that there is a positive relation between directors’ 
motivation to participate and board strategic involvement. The coefficients are 
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significant for competitive strategy (0.185), strategy follow-up (0.191), social strategy 
(0.126) and overall strategy (0.280). This hypothesis is supported. Directors’ motivation 
explains the importance of personal attitude, which seems to outperform the incentive 
mechanism represented by ownership.  
On the whole, the results seem to support the idea that board quality attributes 
positively influence board strategic involvement.  
In addition, the study indicates that there is a difference between the effect of 
board quality attributes and board working style in relation to overall strategic 
involvement. According to model III across Table 4 to 7, the value of F-change is 
significant. We could infer that board quality attributes outperform board working style 
concerning board strategic task performance. The claim is further supported from the 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991). That is, board knowledge and board 
diversity are valuable resources that are difficult for competitors to imitate. Structural 
features like the length and frequency of board meetings could be valuable resources; 
however, they are easily duplicated by competing firms. It is perhaps more rewarding to 
focus on quality attributes in order to build a board to create sustained competitive 
advantage.  
Concerning the control variables, our study fails to show their significant 
impacts on board strategic involvement. In particular, board size, CEO duality, the ratio 
of non-executive to executive directors and ownership fail to contribute to board 
strategic involvement.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
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Research on boards and governance has heavily relied on a direct relationship 
between board composition features—board size, CEO duality, the ratio of non-
executive to executive directors and ownership—and firm performance. Small samples 
of large listed firms, usually US-based, have been used for most empirical studies. 
Research on boards in small firms within a European context is less explored and many 
contributions are expected. 
Given the need to improve our understanding of how boards fit into the broader 
framework of governance mechanisms, our study sought to enhance knowledge of 
board strategic task performance. Building on the main findings from previous research, 
we suggest that the board is involved in shaping the firm’s strategic orientation. In 
particular, board working style and board quality aspects seem to contribute more to 
board strategic involvement than do board composition features. We may thus conclude 
that it is fruitful to take a different approach outside the domain of the board 
composition features when analyzing board strategic involvement.  
There are two implications of our study. Considering board composition 
features, our study finds no support for their effects on strategic involvement. Our 
explanation is that process variables like board working style and quality attributes are 
more fundamental than the board composition features that affect board strategic 
involvement. We recognize that we should be more explicit in addressing ownership of 
the non-executive directors in our study, as examined by Filatotchev in a recent study 
(2006). Failing to address ownership of the non-executive directors may affect our 
findings for board composition features; however when three out of the four elements 
(board size, CEO duality and non-executives’ ratio) fail to be related to board strategic 
task performance, the effect of board composition features is in doubt. In addition, 
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studies that found support for board composition features do not necessarily offer 
contradictory findings to ours. The results of such studies may change somewhat if 
process variables like working style and quality attributes are also included in addition 
to board composition features. Nevertheless, such conjecture will only be justifiable 
upon new empirical investigations.  
A second implication of our study is that the most important features affecting 
board strategic involvement are board quality attributes. While a major part of the 
literature deals with structural variables of the boardroom (Daily, Dalton and Cannella 
2003), this paper shows that in small firms, the board could actively perform strategic 
tasks when it has acquired in-depth knowledge of the firm, a broad diversity in skills, 
and the motivation to do a good job. This appears paradoxical in light of the current 
framework of norms and codes in place worldwide.  
This study has some limitations, which could be improved by future studies. 
First, questionnaires were addressed to the CEOs, who in most cases had to judge “their 
boards” with unavoidable personal biases. Analysis based on responses from the 
Chairman or other board members would have increased the validity of the study. 
Second, this study does not take into consideration potential moderating effects, which 
could be a fruitful research direction. For example, we may wish to explore how 
learning activities of the board and the management team (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004) 
moderate the effect of board working style and board quality attributes on board 
strategic involvement. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 research model  
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Table 1: Factor analysis on board strategic tasks (Dependent variables) 
  
  Component 
  competitive follow-up social  
e06a Board formulates strategy proposals .714 .228 .199
e06b Board ratifies long term strategies decisions .845 .258 .139
e06c Board implements strategy decisions .766 .202 .179
e06d Board controls and evaluates strategy decisions .832 .263 .172
e04a Involved in follow-up of cost budgets .229 .875 .160
e04b Involved in follow-up of sales budgets .292 .786 .125
e04c Involved in follow-up of firm liquidity .178 .755 .209
e04d Involved in follow-up of investments .277 .603 .252
e04h Involved in follow-up of HMS (Health, Environment and Safety) .164 .250 .753
e04i Involved in follow-up of natural environment and pollution issues .121 .106 .903
e04k Involved in follow-up CSR issues .274 .226 .667
Cronbach’s Alpha .904 .887 .849
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Table 2: Factor analysis on board quality attributes (Independent variables) 
 
  Component 
  knowledge diversity motivation 
c04a Knowledge of main activities .668 .012 .156 
c04b Knowledge of critical technology and critical competency .816 .114 .169 
c04c Knowledge of weak points in the firms .582 .254 .186 
c04d Knowledge of critical technology .620 .255 .104 
c07a Diversity in functional background among board members .247 .600 .182 
c07b Diversity in industry background among board members .075 .551 .077 
c07c Diversity in educational background among board members .121 .609 .224 
c08b Board members are positively motivated through legal 
responsibility/liability .142 .134 .341 
c08c Board members are positively motivated through personal 
professional standards .202 .239 .949 
Cronbach’s Alpha .795 .654 .555 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
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Table 3, Correlation Matrix  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Competitive strategy 1                          
2 Follow-up strategy 0.060 1                        
3 Social strategy 0.032 0.034 1                    
4 Knowledge .262** .200** .139** 1                   
5 Diversity .219** .246** 0.074 .116* 1                  
6 Motivation .248** .186** .182** 0.027 .105* 1                    
7 Existence of regular 
board evaluations .251** .123* .180** .132** .140** .141** 1                   
8 Number of board 
meetings 2002 .117* .156** -.142** -.103* .116* -0.012 .113* 1           
9 Length of board 
meetings hours in 2002 .163** .104* -0.046 -0.037 .129* 0.046 0.053 .142** 1          
  
10 Board size -0.047 0.010 -.138** -.194** 0.081 -0.041 -0.002 .364** .186** 1          
11 CEO duality -0.013 -0.041 .159** .111* -.139** -0.064 -0.023 -.215** -.112* -.397** 1      
12 Non-executives’ ratio 0.021 -0.013 .103* .132** -0.068 0.094 -0.006 -.230** -.116* -.411** .234** 1        
13 Ownership of the board -0.039 -0.022 .145** .186** -.129** -0.051 -0.010 -.230** -.123** -.365** .353** .197** 1       
14 Year of foundation  -0.058 0.066 -0.061 0.049 0.005 -0.021 0.007 -0.028 -0.033 0.028 -.102* 0.043 -0.006 1     
15 Previous performance -0.007 0.044 -0.036 -0.077 0.061 0.031 0.092 .097* .099* 0.017 0.037 -0.034 -0.043 -0.027 1   
16 Number of employees 
2002 -0.013 0.008 -0.053 -.139** -0.043 0.011 0.063 .217** .114* .274** -.099* -.121** -.165** -.120** .130** 1 
0.080 17 Last change in the board composition 0.024 0.027 -.158** -0.088 0.032 0.047 .111* .215** .215** .370** -.289** -.190** -.231** .219** -0.047
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 4: Regression analysis on overall strategic involvement  
 Model 1 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model II 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model III 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Board size -0.128 -0.097 -0.030 
CEO duality 0.023 0.031 0.057 
Non-executives’ ratio -0.047 -0.034 -0.057 
Ownership of the board -0.022 -0.001 0.022 
Year of foundation  -0.073 -0.065 -0.039 
Previous performance 0.090 0.044 0.021 
Number of employees (2002) -0.043 -0.062 0.012 
Last change in board 
composition 0.048 0.007 0.013 
Length of board meetings 
(hours in 2002)  
 0.100 0.071 
Number of board meetings 
(2002) 
 0.031 0.041 
Existence of regular board 
evaluations 
 0.308** 0.202** 
Knowledge   0.313** 
Diversity   0.257** 
Motivation   0.280** 
Adj R2 -.007 0.093  0.351 
F Change .772 10.998 ** 36.848** 
**  significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 5: Regression analysis on competitive strategy 
 
 Model 1 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model II 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model III 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Board size -0.167 -0.137 -0.088 * 
CEO duality -0.007 0.001 0.012 
Non-executives’ ratio -0.060 -0.052 -0.071 
Ownership of the board -0.102 -0.085 -0.080 
Year of foundation  -0.093 -0.084 -0.066 
Previous performance 0.087 0.047 0.036 
Number of employees (2002) -0.065 -0.079 -0.033 
Last change in board 
composition 0.063 0.025 0.023 
Length of board meetings 
(hours in 2002) 
 0.124* 0.109* 
Number of board meetings 
(2002) 
 -0.003 0.006 
Existence of regular board 
evaluations 
 0.262** 0.194** 
Knowledge   0.249** 
Diversity   0.129* 
Motivation   0.185** 
Adj R2 0.007 0.083 0.192 
F Change 1.257 8.518** 13.190** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6: Regression analysis on strategic follow-up 
 
 Model 1 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model II 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model III 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Board size 0.000 -0.018 0.025 
CEO duality 0.052 0.057 0.078 
Non-executives’ ratio -0.021 0.004 -0.009 
Ownership of the board 0.021 0.042 0.063 
Year of foundation  0.042 0.048 0.066 
Previous performance 0.044 0.027 0.008 
Number of employees (2002) 0.046 0.026 0.080 
Last change in board 
composition 0.062 0.040 0.047 
Length of board meetings 
(hours in 2002) 
 0.063 0.040 
Number of board meetings 
(2002) 
 0.143* 0.148* 
Existence of regular board 
evaluations 
 0.067 -0.007 
Knowledge   0.198** 
Diversity   0.207** 
Motivation   0.191** 
Adj R2 -0.016 0.002 0.124 
F Change 0.45 2.609* 13.533** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table7: Regression analysis on social strategy  
 
 Model 1 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model II 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Model III 
(standard 
coefficients) 
Board size 0.019 0.074 0.089 
CEO duality -0.016 -0.020 -0.003 
Non-executives’ ratio 0.030 0.008 0.004 
Ownership of the board 0.113 0.101 0.127 
year of foundation  -0.044 -0.052 -0.041 
previous performance 0.000 -0.017 -0.031 
Number of employees (2002) -0.040 -0.030 -0.004 
Last change in the board 
composition -0.102 -0.098 -0.090 
Length of board meetings 
(hours in 2002) 
 -0.093 -0.109 
Number of board meetings 
(2002) 
 -0.146* -0.145* 
Existence of regular board 
evaluations 
 0.194** 0.154** 
Knowledge   0.035 
Diversity   0.135* 
Motivation   0.126* 
Adj R2 0.007 0.052 0.081 
F Change 1.253 5.321** 3.783** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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